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UPDATING DATA PROTECTION:
PART I - IDENTIFYING THE OBJECTIVES
A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT

Fred H. Cate

Introduction
Data protection laws face increasing stress and scrutiny in North America, Europe, Asia, and
elsewhere in the face of sweeping changes in consumer behavior, technologies, markets, and data
flows. This paper is intended to facilitate discussion about the objectives those laws should be
designed to serve in the 21st century. The paper does not offer any conclusions, but rather sets out a
statement of problems raised by current data protection systems, and identifies possible directions that
modern data protection laws might take.
While part of a broader project the Centre for Information Policy Leadership at Hunton & Williams
LLP is undertaking to identify the core objectives of data protection in both public and private sectors
around the world, this paper responds to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s announcement of its
December 7, 2009, Roundtable entitled “Exploring Privacy”. It is therefore primarily focused on data
protection in the United States applicable to the private sector.

The Problem
Data protection law is increasingly challenged to protect personal information adequately, without
imposing unnecessary costs on individuals, data users, and regulators. In the face of significant
changes in consumer behavior, technologies, markets, and data flows, data protection laws and their
application on both sides of the Atlantic and in Asia appear increasingly challenged.
•

Individuals are inundated with privacy policies and breach notices that they have neither the
time nor the resources to act on. Often those notices create confusion and pose questions that
create only the illusion, but not the reality, of informed consumer choice.

•

Data protection laws and enforcement are often unrelated to substantive privacy protection.
Many of today’s most intrusive data practices, for example, by law enforcement and national
security authorities, go effectively unregulated, while other activities that pose few privacy
risks are subject to more extensive legal requirements.

•

Similarly, expanded access by law enforcement and national security authorities to personal
data collected by the private sector creates new risks for both individuals and private sector
data stewards that the data may be lost or otherwise compromised or used for purposes far
beyond those for which they were collected.

•

Moreover, because protections for personal data are often in tension with beneficial uses of
those data, existing data protection laws often result in privacy being sacrificed—often
unnecessarily—to those competing uses. For example, privacy regulations can restrict
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research in healthcare and other fields because of the cost or practical difficulty of complying
with applicable laws, even though the research may present few, if any, risks to personal
privacy and offer significant benefits to society.
•

Data protection laws and practices often impose real costs on institutional operations,
innovation, and efficiency that are unrelated to their ineffectiveness in protecting privacy,
taking resources away from more effective privacy protection processes. This is especially
likely where enforcement focuses on procedural requirements, such as providing
comprehensive notices, rather than substantive protections, such as regulating harmful uses of
data.

•

Regulators face the daunting challenge of trying to oversee a flood of disparate data
processing activities, many of which occur outside of their jurisdiction, with limited resources
and often inadequate legal authority. Local, provincial, and national data protection authorities
are increasingly challenged by global, widely dispersed data flows via the internet, handheld
devices, and other technological innovations.

•

Yet those same innovations and new applications, such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, and
other “social” networking sites, expand the range and scope of harms that individuals can
unknowingly inflict on themselves or others.

•

Despite efforts at multinational frameworks, data protection law and enforcement continue to
be the responsibility of national or subnational authorities, while data flows have grown
increasingly global. Inconsistent and ineffective data protection regimes do not properly serve
anyone.

In response to these and other challenges, policy makers and regulators in Washington, Brussels, and
elsewhere are beginning the process of reexamining current data protection laws, and have invited
participation from industry, advocacy groups, and academics. The Centre for Information Policy
Leadership at Hunton & Williams LLP applauds these efforts and welcomes the invitation to
participate.
The first step in determining how effective data protection laws are today or how they could be
improved in the future is to identify the goals that they are intended to serve. While there has been
considerable discussion about the definition of privacy and the role of government in protecting it,
there has not been enough systematic thought given to the fundamental question of the goals that data
protection law should accomplish. The failure to address this core question has been especially acute
in recent years and in light of significant changes in the broad context in which data protection occurs.
Where such discussions have occurred over the past four decades, two objectives seem to dominate: to
enhance individual control over personal information and to protect individuals from harmful uses of
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their information. While undoubtedly important, these two goals today appear inadequate. Individual
control seems both impossible in many instances in the face of the proliferation of information
technologies, and potentially undesirable in some situations. In reality, data protection laws in many
countries act to limit individual control by permitting extensive use of personal data without consent
or, in some cases, even notice. Prevention of harm appears even more inadequate. While this is clearly
an important objective, it entirely omits the concept of privacy as a human right that is recognized
today in many countries, and it ignores the extent to which public opinion has overwhelmingly
condemned certain practices (for example, telemarketing) that arguably threaten no specific privacy
harm.

The Centre’s Project
The task that the Centre is undertaking is to identify for broader discussion the core objectives of data
protection that will work in a world of modern technologies, markets, and data flows. Those objectives
are critical to the on-going evaluation of existing laws and the creation of effective new ones. Those
objectives should also be the basis for institutional accountability for their use of personal data: they
should set forth the objectives of data protection and provide the basis for evaluating the extent to
which those goals are achieved. The Centre is hopeful that this paper will spark a robust debate and
welcomes the comments of others.
The collection and use of personal data often raise different issues and are subject to different
constraints in the private sector than in the public sector. For example, the collection and use of
personal data by governments are more likely to serve important public objectives, be subject to legal
compulsion, and be insulated from market forces than by commercial or not-for-profit entities.
Similarly, there may be different constraints on transparency and different tools available for
protecting privacy in the public sector than in the private sector. And the jurisdiction of data protection
authorities often differs significantly between public and private sectors.
The Centre believes that it is important to address the objectives of data protection in both the public
and the private sector, especially as there is increasing interaction between the two as governments
increasingly look to the private sector as a source of personal information. However, because of the
important differences between the two contexts, the Centre intends to consider the objectives for data
protection in each sector separately. Those objectives may well overlap, but it is important that they
not be intermingled indiscriminately.
As the first phase of its project to assess the effectiveness of data protection laws, the Centre proposes
identifying core objectives of data protection in the public sector and, separately, in the private sector,
in light of consumer behavior, modern technologies, markets, and data flows.
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Initial Possible Directions
The process of identifying the objectives of data protection will be neither easy nor quick, but in anticipation of
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s December 7, 2009, Roundtable “Exploring Privacy,” the Centre thought it
would be useful to identify some initial thoughts about defining privacy objectives for the private sector. These
do not reflect any final views of the Centre or the opinions of its members, but we hope that they will help
prompt and inform the on-going discussion.
•

Prevent Harm. Although it is clear that prevention of harm to individuals and society is not a complete
definition of the objectives of data protection, it is likely to be an essential component. Surprisingly,
prevention of harm has played comparatively little role in many data protection laws, which have
focused instead on objectives unrelated to harm or have been concerned primarily with remedies for
harm after it has occurred. One critical role for privacy law, however, could well be to create
appropriate incentives so that private-sector collectors and users of personal data take those reasonable
steps within their means to prevent harmful uses of those data. “Harm” would presumably not include
appropriate uses of accurate information that result in disadvantages to an individual—for example, a
determination not to lend to a consumer based on that individual’s past failure to repay loans—but
instead would include injuries resulting from data being inaccurate, incomplete, out-of-date, or lost or
stolen. The concept of harm is therefore broader than physical or economic injury, but it does not
include all negative effects resulting from the use of personal data. One important corollary of
prevention of harm as an objective is that laws and regulations that do not act to prevent harm would
require some other, explicit justification.

•

Secure Data. A key component of preventing harm is ensuring that personal data are secured against
loss, theft or other compromise. Perfect protection should not be the goal, but rather appropriate
protection taking into account factors such as the sensitivity of the data, the potential for being used to
cause harm, and the severity of any likely harm. Data protection laws should likely create reasonable
incentives to ensure that personal data are secured appropriately.

•

Rethink the Role of Consent. Individual consent has played a significant role in data protection,
beginning with Alan Westin’s path-breaking 1967 study, Privacy and Freedom, in which he defined
privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and
to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”1 Obtaining consent and providing
“privacy notices” to individuals for the purpose of obtaining consent have become a proxy for
individual control, and have evolved into the central focus of many data protection regimes in the
United States and elsewhere.2 Irrespective of whether consent was ever an appropriate basis for data
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Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 7 (1967).
See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, “The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles,” in Consumer Protection in
the Age of the Information Economy 343, 356-360 (2006); Paul M. Schwartz, “Privacy and Democracy in
Cyberspace,” 52 Vanderbilt Law Review 1607, 1659 (1999); Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair
Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace—A Report to Congress 11 (2000); OECD, Guidelines on
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. (C 58 final) (Oct. 1, 1980), at ¶
7; Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with
2
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protection, it is well documented that consent does not work in many settings today and often results in
weakening the protection for personal privacy. More importantly, however, one might reasonably
wonder whether consent was ever an appropriate objective for data protection. A more appropriate role
for consent may well be as one tool for protecting privacy, rather than as the goal of privacy protection.
Viewed as an important tool, but only one of many, for protecting privacy, consent might be employed
where experience and research have shown it can be effective (for example, in settings where consent is
not required and therefore can be truly voluntary), but not relied on in other settings.
•

Ensure Accountability. To date, data protection systems have tended to be more focused on compliance
with procedural requirements, rather than ensuring that an organization is accountable for its acquisition
and use of personal data. This is understandable, given how complex the conditions for accountability
can be—often including, for example, clear principles, training, oversight, redress, etc.—and how hard
they can be to demonstrate. But the difficulty of the task should not undermine the importance of the
goal—namely, that data protection systems ensure appropriate accountability for the stewardship of
personal data.

•

Provide Redress. While providing redress to individuals affected by uses of personal data may not seem
an appropriate objective of data protection, it is certainly an essential component. Redress not only
attempts to repair injuries done to individuals, but also to provide feedback to users of personal data and
regulators that can be used to improve data protection systems and avoid future harms. Without
appropriate mechanisms for redress, it is difficult to imagine a data protection system achieving its
other objectives. Appropriate redress must be swift, accessible to individuals who believe they have

been injured, and efficient. Where redress becomes unnecessarily burdensome, it discourages
individuals to seek help and can inappropriately impede valuable data flows. One particular
challenge in providing redress is that individuals often do not know the source of the data that
they believe has been used inappropriately. This thorny issue will have to be addressed
whether through coding data to indicate source, greater transparency of data processing
operations, or other measures.
•

Guarantee Effective Enforcement. In addition to providing redress for individual data subjects,
any system of data protection will require effective enforcement mechanisms. “Effective”, in
this context, requires not only that the mechanisms achieve a high degree of compliance, but
also that they are well targeted to do so, and so do not squander scarce resources of either
government or industry officials. To date, enforcement of data protection systems has often
proved both inadequate to achieve broad compliance, but also overly broad and expensive (for
example, when state attorneys general in the United States bring duplicative enforcement
actions, often in the wake of federal enforcement). This disserves privacy and wastes
resources. As with redress, enforcement may seem an odd objective of data protection, but it is
an essential component without which other objectives are unlikely to be achieved.

Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (Eur. O.J. 95/L281),
Preamble, ¶ 25; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Privacy Framework, 2004/AMM/014rev1 (Nov.
2004), at 12.

5

•

Remember Global Data Flows. Few uses of personal data today occur entirely within one
nation or jurisdiction. Personal data are increasingly transferred across national boundaries for
processing, storage, or other use. Many private-sector enterprises manage their data in
multinational repositories or outsource data processing activities to multinational
organizations. It is increasingly difficult to think of any transaction involving personal data—
whether using a credit card, visiting a doctor, making an airplane reservation, or browsing the
internet—where the data stays within one country. Yet most data processing laws are still
adopted within a single country (or state or province). This mismatch between law and daily
reality is burdensome to all concerned. While multinational data processing standards are one
important approach to this conundrum, there is growing reason to think that the more
immediate and practical solution is through cooperation and even collaboration in enforcement
actions, and better systems for each nation or jurisdiction to recognize the enforcement
activities of others. At the same time, it is important that national enforcement actions respect
the sovereignty of other nations and their laws, and the difficult position of multinational
companies in complying with conflicting legal requirements. Clearly, reconciling these
competing interests is not easy, but the failure to explicitly take into account the multinational
nature of most information flows threatens to undermine the ability of any system of data
protection to achieve its objectives and therefore diminish the protection accorded privacy.

•

Treat Privacy in Context. In addition to taking into account the increasingly global nature of
information flows, it is important that any system of data protection be cognizant of a wider
range of contextual issues, for example, that many uses of data have great value to individuals
and society; that privacy is a critical value but only one of many that policy makers must
attend to; that resources for crafting, complying with, and enforcing data protection laws are
limited and constantly needed for other activities; and that while individuals are often very
concerned about privacy (or at least their own privacy), they face many competing demands
for their time and so often are not willing to expend great efforts to protect privacy. None of
these or similar considerations weakens the importance of providing appropriate data
protection, but ignoring them is likely to only weaken that protection.

•

Treat Law in Context. Finally, it seems essential that policymakers also be clear as to the
intended role of law and the context in which it operates. While law is an essential part of
sound data protection, it seems unlikely (as well as undesirable) to attempt to use law to
compel all behavior regarding personal data. Instead, law is likely to be more effective if
employed as one of many incentives for desired types of behavior concerning data collection
and use. In some settings, it may actually be a weaker incentive than economic and
reputational interests. In the context of a variety of incentives, law might best be thought of as
setting basic standards or principles for data processing, a floor of legal requirements, and
gap-filling measures where other incentives do not appear to operate effectively. Developing a
clearer understanding of the proper role of data protection law can help improve efficiency,
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reduce costs, and heighten the effectiveness of privacy laws by focusing them where needed
most. Similarly, a clearer understanding of the law’s role might help reduce situations in
which the law operates as a disincentive for good data protection, for example, as is the case
when law operates a strict liability trigger to punish innocent errors with the same speed and
force as reckless or deliberate conduct.

Conclusion
It is far too early in this process to speak of a “conclusion.” The list of future possible directions for
privacy objectives is neither exhaustive nor necessarily correct. Rather, as noted, it is one of numerous
efforts to help inform the on-going debate. The Centre believes that the discussion about the objectives
of data protection is both critical and timely, and we forward to participating.
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